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‘Experiential knowledge’ is increasingly recognised as an important inﬂuence on reproductive decision-
making. ‘Experiential knowledge of disability’ in particular is a signiﬁcant resource within prenatal
testing/screening contexts, enabling prospective parents to imagine and appraise future lives affected by
disability. However, the concept of ‘experiential knowledge’ has been widely critiqued for its idiosyn-
crasy, its impermanence and consequently its perceived inferiority to (medical) knowledge. This paper
explores some of these key critiques of experiential knowledge through an analysis of its constitution
and uses in the context of reproductive decision-making. Seventeen UK-resident women with Spinal
Muscular Atrophy (SMA), or with SMA in their family, took part in two in-depth interviews: one in 2007
e9 and the other in 2013e4. By comparing and contrasting these women's accounts at two time points,
this paper demonstrates the stark contrast between ‘lived experience’ of SMA (the visceral everyday
realities of life with the condition) and the various way(s) this experience was transformed into, and
presented as, ‘knowledge’ through the processes of making, and accounting, for reproductive decisions.
The analysis highlights that multiple, distinct and sometimes competing experiential frameworks are
used to conceptualise SMA across time and context. However, rather than evidence of its fallibility, this
ﬁnding highlights that ‘knowledge’ is an inappropriate vessel with which to capture and transfer
‘experiential knowledge’. Rather, we need to consider how to value such insight in ways that harnesses
its inherent strength without leaving it vulnerable to the epistemological critiques attracted by labelling
it ‘knowledge’.
© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Experiential knowledge, that is, knowledge gained through
either ‘embodied’ (direct bodily experience) or ‘empathetic’
(knowledge gained through close emotional ties with others)
experience of a phenomenon (Abel and Browner, 1998), has been
increasingly acknowledged in the health and social science litera-
ture as a signiﬁcant body of knowledge (Prior, 2003; Baillergeau
and Duyvendak, 2016; Caron-Finterman et al., 2005) and one of
substantial inﬂuence in the context of health care decision-making
(Bulme, 2016; Lippman, 1999; Markens et al., 2010; France et al.,
2011). The decline of paternalistic models of medicine, the paral-
leled increase in, and emphasis on, personalised medicine and
patient organisations together with the gains made by both the
feminist and disability rights movement since the 1970s have all
contributed to the expanding value placed on the realm of theLtd. This is an open access articleexperiential as a resource with which to supplement, supplant or
challenge medical knowledge (Abel and Browner, 1998; Frank,
1995; D’Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Williams and Popay, 1994;
Bulme, 2016; Baillergeau and Duyvendak, 2016; Rabeharisoa
et al., 2014; Britten and Maguire, 2016; Boardman, 2014).
Within the domain of reproduction, the development of
increasingly sophisticated reproductive technologies (such as
NIPT), and the acceleration of advances in genomic medicine have
created a context in which the role and value assigned to experi-
ential knowledge is gaining signiﬁcance. Would-be parents, for
example, are being increasingly called upon to make reproductive
decisions based on ‘risk factors’ (rather than deﬁnitive diagnoses),
and in relation to increasingly obscure conditions with uncertain
prognoses (Novas and Rose, 2000; McClaren et al., 2008). It is
against this backdrop of burgeoning probabilistic reprogenetic in-
formation, yet also an increased use of reproductive genetic tech-
nologies, that experiential knowledge has gained status as a
tangible resource with which to navigate complex decisions thatunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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that explore experiential knowledge in the domain of reproduction
have focused on women's embodied experiences of pregnancy and
how these are brought to bear on decision-making (e.g. Lippman,
1999; Katz Rothman, 1984; Markens et al., 2010; Abel and
Browner, 1998). However, more recently, ‘experiential knowledge
of disability’ e that is, the insights born out of the daily realities of
living with a disabling condition-has also been acknowledged as
another form of experiential knowledge that may exist indepen-
dently of, or co-exist with, women's embodied experiences of
pregnancy (France et al., 2011; Etchegary et al., 2008; Boardman,
2014, Boardman et al., 2017a).
‘Experiential knowledge of disability’, it is argued, is of partic-
ular relevance in the context of prenatal screening, testing and
selective termination decisions as it may be used as a resource with
which to imagine- and appraise-the nature and quality of future
lives affected by that condition (Boardman, 2014; Dudding et al.,
2000; Sawyer et al., 2006; Polnay et al., 2002; Raspberry and
Skinner, 2011; France et al., 2011; Etchegary et al., 2008). For this
reason, much like women's bodily experiences of pregnancy,
experiential knowledge of disability has been ascribed political
value (Bricher, 1999; Parens and Asch, 2000; Asch and Wasserman,
2015) and regarded by many-particularly disability rights
supporters-as the counter-weight to medicalised representations
of disability in screening and testing contexts (Williams et al., 2002;
Potter et al., 2008), offering alternative insights into life with the
condition that are deemed to fall beyond the remit of reproductive
genetic medicine (Ahmed et al., 2007).
Whilst this body of literature highlights the growing
acknowledgement and various uses of ‘experiential knowledge of
disability’ in reproductive contexts (Etchegary et al., 2008; France
et al., 2011), it nevertheless remains a concept which is poorly
deﬁned and understood. Indeed, many commonly accepted un-
derstandings of experiential knowledge have cast it primarily in
terms of its similarities and differences to medical knowledge, in
order to either highlight its deﬁciencies (Prior, 2003) or to
demarcate its contrasting areas of strength (Wynne, 1996). Whilst
this comparison has been pivotal to the acceptance of experiential
knowledge as a site of alternative expertise, however, this framing
nevertheless also relegates the domain of the experiential to a
state of perpetual dependence; as ‘always-in-relationship-to’
medical knowledge, ever vulnerable to critiques of deﬁciency, lack
and inferiority.
This paper considers this position and the role and value of
‘experiential knowledge of disability’ as it is produced by and
through accounts of reproductive decision-making. Drawing on
34 longitudinal in-depth interviews, the presented analysis ex-
plores the reproductive attitudes and decisions of 17 women
clinically deﬁned as ‘at risk’ of transmitting a neuromuscular
condition, Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA). Two interviews were
conducted with each participant (with a 6/7 year interval) in
order to capture the shifting nature of their lived experience of
SMA and to chart changes in their reproductive views and de-
cisions during this time. By including two time points, and of-
fering a comparison between them, this paper outlines the stark
contrast between the cacophonous and ever-changing world of
lived experience and the much more static and ordered realm of
‘experiential knowledge’. Finally, this paper will offer a critique of
the notion that ‘knowledge’ is the appropriate prism through
which to view and present experience. Through doing so, the
various ways in which aspirations to knowledge status may
paradoxically undermine, rather than bolster, the status of the
experiential will be considered, highlighting the need for
ongoing critical attention in this area.1.1. Spinal Muscular Atrophy and reproductive genetics
After Cystic Fibrosis, SMA is the most common (potentially fatal)
autosomal recessively inherited condition in the UK, meaning it is a
single gene disorder requiring two carrier parents to transmit. SMA
affects approximately one in every six thousand newborns in the
North West European population (Dreesen et al., 1998). It is a
neuromuscular condition characterised by generalised, and often
severe, muscle weakness. SMA has been sub-categorised into
distinct clinical ‘types’ (I-IV) with different presentations, ages of
onset, severity of muscle weakness and prognoses ranging from
early infantile death in the case of type I to adult-onset muscle
weakness in adulthood in type IV (Dubowitz, 2008).
In order to understand the reproductive dilemmas faced by
families living with SMA, it is ﬁrstly necessary to understand its
typical mode of inheritance. It is estimated that between 1:40 and
1:60 of the general population are ‘carriers’ of SMA (i.e. they can
transmit the condition but have no symptoms) (Wirth, 2000).
When two carrier parents reproduce, they have a:
- 25% chance of a child who will have SMA.
- 50% chance of a child who will be an asymptomatic carrier.
- 25% chance of a child that will be neither a carrier nor have SMA.
Prenatal testing, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) and
cascade carrier screening (the genetic testing of family members of
people with SMA) are all available on the NHS for families with a
conﬁrmed history of SMA.
2. Methods
Interviews were conducted at two time points.
2.1. Phase 1 (P1): in-depth interviews, 2007-9
The ﬁrst round of interviews was conducted 2007e2009 as part
of a larger study of sixty-one participants with SMA in their family
(Boardman, 2010, 2014). The interviews were designed to elicit
participants' stories of life with SMA and a discussion of their views
around, and (intended) uses of, reproductive genetic technologies.
Participants were recruited through the main support group for
families living with SMA in the UK- SMA Support UK. Participants
were recruited using a variety of channels; through the group's
annual conference, advertisements in their publications, personal
contacts and snowball sampling. Two participants were also
recruited through disability organisations. The 17 participants
whose data is reported on in this paper were all recruited through
SMA Support UK.
Interviewing took place through a variety of channels (tele-
phone, face-to-face and email), allowing for participant preference
and practical constraints. Telephone and face-to-face interviews
lasted, on average, for 70 minutes, and email interviews took place
over periods lasting from three weeks to eight months. Email
interviewing is a method of interviewing whereby interview
questions and answers are exchanged electronically (Burns, 2010).
This method of interviewing allowed participants to answer in in-
stalments, at dates and times of convenience (McCord and
Schwaber Kerson, 2006). Use of this method facilitated participa-
tion due to the potentially emotionally demanding nature of the
interview and because the majority of participants were caring for
young children and/or managing complex disabilities.
2.2. Phase 2 (P2): in-depth interviews, 2013-4
The second round of interviews took place 2013e14, some 6/7
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opportunistically as part of another research project. As P1 was not
initially designed to be a longitudinal study, participants' contact
details were not stored beyond its completion. Advertisements
were therefore placed in SMA Support UK's newsletters again for
previous participants to volunteer for a repeat interview. This
second round of interviewing was designed to explore participants'
ongoing experiences with SMA, any reproductive decisions un-
dertaken since P1 and any changes in views around, or uses of,
genetic technologies. Informed consent was sought from each
participant at P2, not only for a second interview, but also for the re-
interrogation of their P1 interview beyond the originally intended
timeframe.
The calls led to responses from 21 individuals. One individual
was excluded as their diagnosis had changed since P1 and a further
two because they had not participated in P1. One individual initially
responded, but subsequent attempts to arrange an interview were
unsuccessful, leading to a ﬁnal sample of 17 individuals who were
interviewed at both P1 and P2, all of whom were women and
whose ages ranged from 25 to 61 at P2 (average age 39). As the
interviews were designed to explore SMA experiences as well as
reproductive decisions and attitudes, women who were no longer
at reproductive age at P2 (deﬁned as 15e44) were nevertheless still
included. Fourwomenwere not of reproductive age by P2, although
one of themwas still within range for much of the P1-P2 time lapse.
The range of experience with different types of SMA was broad,
with the ﬁnal sample including four participants with experience of
type I, seven with type II, four with type III and two participants
associated with variant forms of SMA, Spinal Muscular Atrophy and
Respiratory Distress (SMARD) and Spinal Bulbar Muscular Atrophy
(SBMA).
The sampling strategy for P2, whilst leading to the successful
recruitment of 17 participants, posed particular limitations. Firstly,
the sample was limited to those who self-selected for a second
interview, which may reﬂect their desire to tell a particular story.
Moreover, reliance on SMA Support UK to identify participants may
have excluded individuals whose involvement with SMA Support
UK had dwindled or ended entirely, or those who did not identify
with the aims or ethos of the organisation. However, the partici-
pants who took part at P2 nevertheless represented a broad spec-
trum of experiences: eight had SMA themselves, ﬁve were parents,
and the sample also included one aunt, two siblings and a spouse of
someone with SMA. The sample also included two mothers whose
child with SMA had died during the P1-P2 time lapse.
Fifteen of the P2 interviews were carried out over the telephone
and two were carried out face-to-face, with the majority opting for
the same method of interview as they had done in P1.
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Biomedical
and Scientiﬁc Research Ethics Committee (Warwick Medical
School).
3. Analysis
Interviews from both P1 and P2 were transcribed verbatim
(with names and identiﬁers removed or changed), resulting in 34
interview transcripts (P1 and P2 combined). A single researcher
conducted all of the interviews and qualitative analysis, under the
supervision of two senior academics. As the P1 data had already
been analysed in 2006e7 using a constructivist grounded theory
approach (using Nvivo 7), the P2 data was imported directly into
the existing Nvivo project ﬁle and the two transcripts were
assigned to an individual participant using Nvivo 10's ‘case’ func-
tion. An iterative comparative analysis was then undertaken which
allowed for an exploration not only of participants' ongoing stories
and their reproductive decision-making, but also an in-depthanalysis of the various ways in which the re-telling of their expe-
riences- in light of later events- contrasted with P1. This was done
using a comparative analysis approach and both using, and
extending, the existing coding framework from P1, as well as cross-
referencing emergent themes with key concepts from the relevant
literature. Whilst the literature was used to interpret the devel-
oping analysis, however, the direction of the analysis remained
‘data driven’ throughout (Gibbs, 2007). For example, it became
clear that therewere divisions between those participants who had
remained consistent in their attitudes and decisions between P1
and P2, and those who had changed their minds with growing
experience and altering life circumstances. This divisionwas critical
to the development of the analysis.
The fact that the P1 data had already been analysed strength-
ened the approach to the secondary analysis as it meant that the
researcher was blind to the unfolding narrative of the participants
(due to the length of time that had elapsed). The independence of
the two strands provided an analytic distance that facilitated a
focus on the, often subtle, contradictions and discrepancies be-
tween the accounts given at the two time points, that might
otherwise have been missed.
The women whose data are presented within this paper were
selected because they most eloquently and clearly captured the key
themes and ﬁndings of the analysis.
4. Results
The results of the analysis for this paper will be divided into two
sections. The ﬁrst section explores the views and decisions of
women who presented their experiential knowledge of SMA as
being of cumulative value over time. The second section highlights
the perspectives of women who instead presented their experien-
tial knowledge as existing in multiple (and sometimes competing)
versions, although not necessarily of unequal value.
4.1. ‘I look back now and think I was quite naïve’: experiential
knowledge as cumulative
Seven of the seventeen women in the sample compared and
contrasted the nature and value of their experiential knowledge
between P1 and P2. One such person, Melissa, aged 44 at P2, is
the sister of Andrew, who was diagnosed with Spinal Bulbar
Muscular Atrophy (SBMA) in his late twenties, during Melissa's
ﬁrst pregnancy. Spinal Bulbar Muscular Atrophy, unlike classic
SMA, is X-linked, which means it is transmitted by females and
expressed in males. Given her brother's diagnosis, Melissa had a
50/50 chance of being a carrier herself. The male children of
female carriers have a 50/50 chance of developing SBMA,
whereas the female children of female carriers have a 50/50
chance of being a carrier. Melissa described her reaction to her
brother's diagnosis and the perceived risk to her pregnancy in
the following way at P1 (when her child was two years old):
After Andrew's diagnosis, I was in fact some 10e12 weeks
pregnant, had just split with my husband, the father of my baby,
and to be honest hadn't really given it [the possibility of SBMA
affecting the foetus] much thought … until my Doctor referred
me urgently for a test to be carried out. I attended [hospital] and
after a consultation I was told I could be screened to seewhether
I was a carrier via a blood test and I was also offered a test for the
unborn child via taking ﬂuid from the womb. Although it was in
some ways a difﬁcult decision, I discussed all the options with
the doctor, and I didn't feel too concerned. I came to the
conclusion that I wouldn't have the blood test and I would let
life take the ‘fate test’ on the child, as it could be a girl and I
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cope with whatever happened, and I still believe that now. I
have never believed in termination and so I think I would do the
same again if I were to ever have another child.
(P1 email interview: Melissa)
Melissa ultimately decided not to have any testing for SBMA and
went on to have a male child, Toby, six months later. At her P1
interview, Tobywas two years old and Andrew had started using
crutches to walk, but was still working. By P2, however, 6 years
and 10 months later, life was very different for Melissa. Her son,
Toby, was 8 years old and she had re-married. Andrew's health
had deteriorated signiﬁcantly to the point that he used a
wheelchair full time had given up work, and Melissa described
him as ‘virtually house bound’. Melissa had become involved
with attending to his personal care needs which she ﬁtted
around a part-time job and her son, a lifestyle which she
described as ‘difﬁcult to juggle’. Furthermore, Melisa's nephew
(her sister's son), Mark (aged 18 at P2), had recently undergone
genetic testing and whilst asymptomatic at the time, was found
to have SBMA. As a response to this, Melissa took the decision to
undergo genetic testing herself to determine whether Toby
could develop SBMA. She was found not to be a carrier. Melissa
described her decision in the following way:
It's been a tough few years in a lot of ways. Mark's [nephew]
diagnosis hit us hard, and hit him hard. I see him looking at his
uncle and wondering when that's going to happen to him, you
know, and it just…. breaks my heart actually. My sister is trying
to encourage him [ Mark] to take a career path that he can easily
carry on with if he does end up in a wheelchair, but he wants to
do carpentry, and so they're having that battle now, so it's
already causing problems. And when I look back, I …. naively I
suppose…. I mean I look back now and think I was quite naïve
when I sat in that [hospital] when I was pregnant with Toby and
I was just so full of happiness about my ﬁrst baby, I wanted him
so much and I just said, ‘oh no, well regardless of what, you
know, whether it's a boy or a girl, whether it has it [SBMA] or not
I wouldn't-test’, you know, I'd never get rid of it, and that
probably was because it was my ﬁrst child, my brother wasn't
really heavily affected at that point, it wasn't, you know, the
progression hadn't really hit in..[…] … I think having seen my
nephew's reaction …. that could be my son …. so I underwent
the genetic test for him [Toby] and luckily it came back all clear.
But I did feel guilty. I did. Horribly guilty for what I'd done. I
thought, what a risk I took, what a gamble I took on your life.
And I just didn't even properly realise… I don't think …. that I
was even taking it.
(P2 telephone interview: Melissa)
Melissa's ongoing empathetic experiences with SBMA through
her brother's deterioration, her nephew's diagnosis and then the
birth of her own (male) child all contributed to a complete
overhaul of her conceptualisation of SBMA between P1 an P2.
Her desire to surrender control of whether her child had SBMA
at P1 was, by P2, replaced with a new sense of responsibility to
prevent the condition from ever reoccurring. While the genetic
risk to Toby remained entirely unchanged between P1 and P2,
Melissa's estimate of it did. It was not until she experienced the
ongoing realities of life with genetic disease, together with its
reverberations through her family (in the form of her nephew's
diagnosis), that Melissa felt she appreciated the full pictures of
what life is truly like with SBMA, and consequently, the impli-
cations of the decision she had made some eight years
previously.When Melissa conceived again, shortly after receiving conﬁr-
mation of her non-carrier status, and 6 months prior to P2, she
approached the pregnancy in an entirely different way, although
the pregnancy ended in spontaneous miscarriage at 12 weeks:
It was just a very different experience [compared to ﬁrst preg-
nancy]. I'm just a very different person now… I didn't have any
testing at all with Toby, but this time I had everything I was
offered. Unfortunately for us, the baby actually died before we
had our results [standard antenatal screening tests]. My hus-
band and I had made the decision that if anything showed up,
we would have to seriously consider a termination. I wouldn't
want a termination, and I still don't think I agree with it, but I
suppose I don't feel as prepared to make the call about what a
baby should or shouldn't have to endure in its lifetime, like I did
before. I don't think I can play God again. I thought I knew, and I
think I got it wrong, because you don't know how that child
would handle it in their life. Mark and Andrew both suffer
terribly, you know, in different ways, but they do suffer, and is it
fair to put that onto someone? And to know you're putting that
onto someone? You have to think about it [the baby] living with
that condition all its life-even after you've gone- and you know,
things constantly change. In the end, the pregnancy didn't go
ahead, but at least this time I [sigh]… I felt I'd done all I could.
(P2 telephone interview: Melissa)
Unlike her pregnancy with Toby, which Melissa described as
being full of the happiness, expectation and novelty that a ﬁrst-
time and much-wanted pregnancy brings, Melissa approached
her second pregnancy as a ‘different person’, altered by the re-
alities that genetic disease had brought upon her family and less
certain of her ability to evaluate the point at which life became
intolerable. It is noteworthy that through accounting for her
dramatic turnaround between P1 and P2, Melissa presented her
most recent experiences at P2 as a more accurate version of
SBMA than those she presented at P1. The incorporation of
Andrew's deterioration and Mark's pre-symptomatic diagnosis
into her experiential knowledge relied on the invalidation of her
earlier experiential knowledge even as it framed, and contrib-
uted to, her current decision to undergo antenatal screening. By
presenting her experiential knowledge as being of cumulative
value, and dismissing her earlier perspective as ‘naïve’, Melissa
‘over-wrote’ her own experiential knowledge to enable her to
more easily navigate the complex terrain of reprogenetic
decision-making and familial responsibility.
Whilst both Melissa's experiential knowledge- and ultimately
her reproductive decision- were completely reversed between
P1 and P2 (as she experienced the increasing encroachment of
SBMA on various spheres of her life), experiential knowledge
emerged from her accounts as a pliable resource; malleable
from both the inside (as her experiences of the condition shif-
ted), but also vulnerable to external reconﬁguration (by expe-
riences entirely unrelated to SBMA).
As SMA is generally understood to be mildly progressive, it
might be assumed that experiences of it become increasingly
difﬁcult overtime, however, this was not the case for all partic-
ipants. Faye was aged 31 at P2, having been diagnosed with type
II SMA when she was three. Faye has never been able to walk
unaided, using an electric wheelchair from age ﬁve. At P1, Faye
was 24 and struggling to ﬁnd accommodation and work to suit
her physical needs and was frustrated that as a young adult she
was both ﬁnancially and physically dependent on her parents. At
P1, Faye was clear that she did not want to have children of her
own, and that SMA was a key part of this view:
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dren…. It would be hard for me as I know that any natural child
of mine would inevitably inherit the SMA defective gene …
Whilst I am accepting that SMA is part of who I am, and I can
mostly overcome a lot of the challenges because I live a very
privileged lifestyle in lots of ways… there is no denying that it is
not all sunshine and roses and can, at times, make things bloody
complicated! I am just not sure that I feel comfortable knowing
that I could be putting others at risk…. and continuing the line
of this defect, which would be inevitable if I were to have chil-
dren of my own. But if, for whatever reason, I did become
pregnant, then yes I'd want to test them for SMA and I'd have to
seriously consider what to do…. .I'd rather it stopped with me,
you know?
(P1 telephone interview; Faye)
Whilst Faye recognized the critical role that her environment
and ‘privileged lifestyle’ played in mediating her experiences of
SMA, she nevertheless still regarded it as a ‘defect’ that she
would not want to transmit to others. Kenen (1994) has referred
to a sense of ‘genetic responsibility’ that emerges alongside the
expansion of genetic knowledge. As we come to learn more
about socially undesirable traits and propensities within our
genetic make-up, a parallel sense of responsibility to prevent
their transmission to future generations is also developing
(Hallowell, 1999; Downing, 2005; Rapp, 1998). However, by P2,
7 years and 3 months following her P1 interview, Faye's sense of
responsibility was very different. At this point, Faye was living
independently (with the support of paid assistants) andworking
full time in a job she loved:
…. I'm 31 now and although I still don't want to have children,
I'm suddenly surrounded by everyone else having children …
Whilst that's lovely, it has brought up … I guess it's suddenly
very real now. And I had a pregnant friend recentlywhowas told
shewas at high risk of her baby having Down's Syndrome… and
she, just in a really off-the-cuff comment said to me ‘well of
course I'd get rid of it’ [if Down's Syndrome conﬁrmed]. And you
know…. . that just really made my skin crawl, and I just didn't
know how to react… I found myself thinking about it more and
looking at all of my friends thinking, ‘I'm disabled, howmany of
you would have gotten rid of me?’ You know, I don't have
Down's Syndrome- but I have something else, and where do you
draw the line? I realised in that moment that in my heart of
hearts I don't agree with it [testing and selective termination]…
[…]…When something forces you to look at your life in ‘life and
death’ terms, I guess it made me think that …. I have a lot to
offer, actually, in spite … or maybe even because of my SMA.
Now I'm older and I've got a bit more life experience I can say
that with some certainty. There are far worse things that could
happen to you than having SMA, you know? It's no tragedy.
(P2 telephone interview; Faye)
It is noteworthy that while Faye reported that her physical
symptoms of SMA had altered somewhat over the time lapse
between interviews, that it was instead her changing relation-
ship to parenthood, her direct confrontation with selective
reproduction, her increased life experience and altered living/
working environment that contributed most to her re-
evaluation of SMA. Through her empathetic experiences of her
friend's pregnancies (Abel and Browner, 1998), Faye's sense of
genetic risk- previously ‘latent’- had been brought sharply into
the realm of the ‘manifest’ (Parsons and Atkinson, 1993). Unlike
Melissa, whose experiences of SBMA deterioration were central
to the revision of her experiential knowledge, Faye's accounthighlights the way in which events seemingly unrelated to SMA
could prompt a revision of her views of SMA and attitudes to-
wards selective reproduction.
While emanating from contrasting sources of lived experience
(both within and without SMA), the complete turnaround of
both Faye andMelissa's experiential knowledge between P1 and
P2 were part of a similar approach to distillation. ‘Distillation’
refers to the process of ordering and ﬁltering lived experience
into a comprehensive body of knowledge (Bulme, 2016). For
Melissa and Faye, this ordering involved the construction of
experiential knowledge as incrementally valuable, accumu-
lating and retaining status in a linear manner. With this
approach to distillation, Faye and Melissa's P2 accounts not only
cancelled out, but actually replaced their P1 viewpoints in a
continuous cycle of quasi-paradigmatic shifts. For Faye and
Melissa, as well as the other ﬁve women who generated and
used their experiential knowledge in this way, the domain of the
experiential could be directly transposed onto the epistemic
framework of knowledge, a framework which esteems high
quantities of cumlative information and disvalues
contradictions.
Not all participants, however, strategically invalidated their
previous perspectives in order to bolster the authenticity of
their current views. For these participants, the evolution of
experiential knowledge through time was more nuanced, with
several contrasting versions of it co-existing simultaneously. It is
to these accounts that I will now turn.4.2. ‘The pain is still there, I'm just looking at it from further away’:
experiential knowledge as fragmentary
For ten of the 17 women included in this analysis, the passage of
time between P1 and P2 did not bring about a perceived in-
crease in the amount, and value, of experiential knowledge as
for Faye and Melissa, but rather brought into critical relief the
signiﬁcance of context in the formulation of fragmentary and
competing versions of experiential knowledge.
Annette was 30 years old at P1, working part-time as a solicitor
and living with her husband, Simon, on the east coast of En-
gland. At P1, Annette was going through a traumatic time,
having experienced the death of her infant daughter, Scarlett, to
type I SMA (aged 14 months) just 3 months previously. Annette
described her experiences and views on SMA and reproduction:
You see, I think SMA is just a devastating condition. Our little
Scarlett was as bright as a little button, full of life and full of
smiles right until the end really…. you know, hermindwas…. it
was her body that gave out on her, and really, that's the cruelty
of SMA. These kids are often intelligent, they're …. mentally,
they're intact, as it were. And to lose your child to something like
that, well to say it's any parent's worst nightmare would be the
understatement of the year I think! I made my mind up as she
died, as I held her, that that would be it for me, no more babies.
No more SMA for us. I wouldn't …. I couldn't put another baby
through what our Scarlett went through.
(Annette, face-to-face interview P1)
With the trauma of losing her young daughter still raw, Annette
was clear at P1 that her experiences would not be repeated. Her
sense of responsibility was both underscored and clariﬁed
through her experience of Scarlett's death, extending backwards
and forwards in time and incorporating her felt sense of duty
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Annette's P2 interview, in contrast, took place shortly after her
37th birthday, 7 years and 8 months after P1. By this time, she
was working full time and described her life as ‘full’ and
‘chaotic’. Since P1 she had become heavily involved with charity
fund-raising (primarily for SMA-related charities) and offered
her weekends and evenings to support families affected by a
type I SMA diagnosis. Annette reﬂected on this during her
interview:
You see, even after Scarlett's death, SMA is very much still part
of our lives. It's still with us, and I honestly think that's a good
thing as it’s made us better people. I'm much more under-
standing now than I was back then, I give a little more, if you see
what I mean. I'm less judgmental. I've learnt new skills. You
know, I talk to people about what happened to us, I tell Scarlett's
story. That's something I could never have done [previously] as
I'm actually a very private person. And that's all down to Scarlett
really … [..]..I did say I wouldn't have another SMA baby, and I
haven't, but I suppose I'm less judgmental about that now…. . I
try and focus on all the positives that Scarlett brought into our
lives and continues to do, and I'm grateful every day that she
lived. I'm grateful for every day of those 14 months, and that's
changed, because I couldn't think like that before. I couldn't
bring myself to be grateful, I could only see what I'd lost, not the
wonderful gift I'd been given, and that gift was her.
(Annette, telephone interview, P2)
It has been widely observed in the literature that bereaved
parents must navigate not only the grief and loss at the death of
their child, but must also re-construct their identities and lives
in the liminal and ambiguous spaces that emerge between
parenthood and childlessness (Young et al., 2002). Whilst still
resolute that her reproductive decision had not, and would not,
change, nevertheless, her framing of this, both with and through
her experiential knowledge of SMA (‘telling Scarlett's story’),
had entirely transformed. Annette was now able to focus on the
positive aspects of Scarlett's short life, changing her narrative of
grief and loss into an instrument of healing and hope, and one
that Annette was using purposefully to both ease the pain of
others and preserve her daughter's legacy.
Abel and Browner (1998), by focusing on women's various ex-
periences of pregnancy and of caring for relatives with De-
mentia, have highlighted the different forms of experiential
knowledge that emerge out of embodied and/or empathetic
experiences with a phenomenon. According to their conceptu-
alization, experiential knowledge emerges directly out of
visceral and/or emotional encounters with the world, such that
there is a clear and direct mapping between lived experience
and the ways in which this comes to be translated, or ‘distilled’
into experiential knowledge (Bulme, 2016). Annette's account,
however, highlights that this process of distillation between
‘experiencing’ and ‘knowing’, was not necessarily one of
simpliﬁcation and reductionism. Rather, Annette acknowledged
contrasting versions of Scarlett's life and death that existed as
she selectively privileged different aspects of the story at
different points in so far as they resonated with her present
reality:
Doing the charity work that I do now, I do go over it [Scarlett's
story] quite a lot [with newly diagnosed families].…and even
though I'm …. I'm in a very different place now, I don't sugar
coat it for them, you know? I tell them exactly how it was… anddepending on what day they get me on, they may hear more or
less of the positive side of it [laughs]. Sometimes, like around
her birthday, I tell it very differently… but grief's like that isn't
it? It ebbs and it ﬂows, but to be honest, I don't try tomake them
‘see the bright side of it’ anyway, because actually that's the
reality of it. I think it's important they can be negative about it if
they want to be. You know, I am only able to be the way I am
about it because I'm no longer in the eye of the storm, as it were,
and the fact that I can see they will come out the other side
tomorrow doesn't take away how painful it is for them today…
[…]… and it's the same for me, the pain is very much still there,
I'm just looking at it from further away.
(Annette, telephone interview, P2)
Unlike Faye and Melissa, Annette's P2 interview and her self-
identiﬁed recovery from being in the ‘eye of the storm’ did not
render her experiential knowledge of this time of less value than
her current version of it. Annette told different, but equally ac-
curate, versions of Scarlett's life and death in response to her
current circumstances and positionality. Callon and Rabeharisoa
(2002) as well as Pols (2013) have written about the ﬂuid
characteristics of experiential knowledge that are often over-
looked in the literature. They highlight the dispersion of expe-
rience into multiple- and sometimes competing-bodies of
knowledge across sources and sites. As Pols has argued in her
study of COPD, patients pieced together their experiential
knowledge from various sites including ‘translated bits of
medical knowledge with homegrown know-how and tips from
the neighbors with the weighing of different values in each new
situation’ (Pols, 2013: 88). For participants such as Annette, the
passage of time presented an additional site; her experiential
knowledge at any moment was both co-produced and shaped
by the very lived experience from which it emerged. Impor-
tantly, however, and in contrast to Faye and Melissa, Annette
acknowledged that the fragmentary nature of her experiential
knowledge was not its weakness, but rather its key strength,
enabling her to ‘tailor’ her support to other bereaved parents by
aligning her bereavement experiences with theirs.5. Discussion
As the capacities of genetic technologies advance, reproductive
decision-making is becoming increasingly divorced from the
everyday lived experience of genetic disease. Population-level ge-
netic screening programmes, for example, bring the notion of ge-
netic risk into the lives of people with no previous associationwith,
or experience of, genetic disease (McClaren et al., 2008); severing
genetic disease experience (experiential knowledge) from the
reproductive decisions about them. It is in this context that the
need to understand the role and value of ‘experiential knowledge of
disability’ is becoming increasingly important (Boardman et al.,
2017b).
By drawing on qualitative interview data on reproductive de-
cisions and attitudes with people at risk of transmitting SMA un-
dertaken at two time points (6/7 years apart), this study explicitly
demonstrates the complex relationship that people living in fam-
ilies affected by genetic disease have to their experiential knowl-
edge and its uses within reproductive decision-making. By
delineating the contrast between ‘lived experience’ (the constantly
shifting realm of everyday experience) and ‘experiential knowl-
edge’ (the ordered and re-countable version(s) of that lived expe-
rience), this study highlights that the process of distillation is both
highly political and context dependent.
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alization of experiential knowledge as constantly being over-
written. According to this perspective, experiential knowledge ex-
pands, and crucially-becomes more authentic- overtime and with
increasing quantity. For participants who described their experi-
ences in this way, the multiple (and competing) versions of their
experiential knowledge that developed came to be strategically
ordered and prioritized in order to add epistemic weight to current
views and decisions (‘I can say that with some certainty’, Faye) and
invalidate previous ones (‘I think how naïve I was..’, Melissa). This
paradoxical conceptualization of experiential knowledge, at once
reliable but also continuously in a sate of ﬂux, change and incom-
pleteness, vulnerable to changes both within and without itself,
appeared at the heart of these women's accounts. Indeed, it is
noteworthy that all seven participants who fell within this category
(including Melissa and Faye), described contrasting reproductive
views and decisions at P2 than those expressed at P1, suggesting
that this particular means of generating and presenting experien-
tial knowledge was critical to their ongoing justiﬁcation and ac-
counting for, reversed reproductive views and decisions over time.
However, not all participants hierarchically ordered the
different versions of their experiential knowledge. For the
remaining ten participants, all of whom remained consistent in
their reproductive views and decisions between P1 and P2, expe-
riential knowledge emerged not as an incrementally valuable
resource, but rather as a multiplicity of situated knowledges across
time and context. For these participants, life with SMA could be told
and re-told at various points and in contrasting ways without the
need for one interpretation to be voided before the next could take
its place. For Annette, for example, the interpretation and re-
interpretation of Scarlett's death at P1 and P2 produced two very
different accounts of the same event from the iterant vantage point
of her (ongoing) recovery. The multiple sites of her experiential
knowledge did not render her previous accounts invalid, rather,
these versions were instead incorporated into the complex and
shifting picture Annette developed of her SMA bereavement.
Experiential knowledge emerges from this analysis, therefore,
as containing multiple, competing and sometimes contradictory
frameworks for understanding and appraising genetic disease
which are often strategically prioritized or invalidated in the
context of reproductive decision-making. Given this complexity,
the possibilities (as purported by disability rights supporters) for
usefully incorporating it within reprogenetic decision-making
appear limited. Indeed, its demonstrated divergence from the
epistemological and ontological assumptions of ‘knowledge’ have
been regarded as rendering it an inappropriate resource with
which to make signiﬁcant health-related decisions (Prior, 2003).
However, to dismiss the value of experiential knowledge based on
its ability to simulate, or replace, medical knowledge is to
misconstrue its value (Pols, 2013). Reprogenetic decisions are not
approached in isolation through the weighing, sifting and
appraising of medical information alone, but rather are highly
complex andmulti-faceted decisions towhichmultiple sources and
sites of knowledge and information are brought to bear (France
et al., 2011). Assigning the label of ‘knowledge’ to experiential in-
sights into disability while once serving an important, and politi-
cally expedient, function in bolstering its status vis-a-vis medical
knowledge, has led to the persistent framing of experiential
knowledge by and through its relationship to medical knowledge.
In an age where the fallibility of medical knowledge is increasingly
being acknowledged, however, and traditional power boundaries
between patients and the medical profession re-conﬁgured, the
political impetus to maintain this dichotomy has greatly dimin-
ished. Indeed, even though medical and experiential knowledge
invariably feed into one another in various ways (Markens et al.,2010), the insights into disability possessed by the people who
live intimately with it is inherently different in character, substance
and form than medical knowledge. By valuing experiential
knowledge on its own terms, independent of the rubric of knowl-
edge and expertise, we may more usefully be able to justify and
harness its incorporation into reprogenetic decision-making,
without the need for misleading claims about its permanence,
stability and universality. Indeed, it is these very areas of diver-
gence from ‘knowledge’, its constant oscillations and state of ﬂux as
a ‘living’ resource, that the realm of experiential draws its key
strength.
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